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NEUROSCIENCE CHANGES MORE THAN
YOU CAN THINK
Paul S. Davies†
Peter A. Alces††
Abstract
In this Essay, we consider the contribution of a startling new book, Law
& Neuroscience (L&N), by Owen Jones, Jeffrey Schall, and Francis Shen. It is
a law school course book (a genre not often the focus of a scholarly review
essay) that supports fundamental inquiry into the relationship between
emerging neuroscientific insights and doctrinal conceptions in the law. We
believe that the book shifts the paradigm and so may profoundly affect the
course of normative evaluation of law. In this Essay, we trace and evaluate
the “argument” of the book and suggest ways in which its contribution to the
normative analysis of law may impact students and legal scholars for years to
come. We believe that L&N is that rare work that will, quite literally, change
the way people think.
The book’s power rests, securely, on two premises: (1) legal doctrine
derives mainly from our folk psychological intuitions (based on our inferences
about others’ beliefs, desires, and intentions) concerning human agency and,
in particular, our capacities for practical reason; and (2) progress in the
sciences of the mind, including neuroscience, casts grave doubts on folk
intuitions at the core of our understanding of human agency. It is folk
psychology that gives way to an understanding informed by neuroscience,
compelling revision of our notions of responsibility embodied in contracts,
torts, and criminal law.
Part I describes the dynamic balance and pedagogical power that the
format of L&N achieves. That dynamic and power is illustrated in the contrast
between the neurological reductionism endorsed by Francis Crick and
skepticism expressed by Stephen Morse concerning the relevance of
neuroscience to legal doctrine. On Crick’s view, if our folk psychological
intuitions come into conflict with known neurological facts, it is folk intuitions
that must go. On Morse’s view, by contrast, there are, either in principle or
merely in fact, no discoveries in neuroscience that threaten our folk view of
† Professor, Department of Philosophy, The College of William & Mary.
†† Rita Anne Rollins Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary School of Law. We are
indebted to four of Professor Alces’s students at the College of William & Mary School of Law, Tyler F.
Chriscoe, J.D., 2016, Eric M. Loose, J.D., 2016, W. Matt Morgan, J.D., 2015, and Tyler J. Rosa, J.D., 2016 for
their outstanding research assistance on this project.
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ourselves. In their judicious selection of theoretical perspectives and case
studies, the editors of L&N sustain the Crick-Morse dichotomy across a wide
range of substantive legal issues.
We complete our analysis in Part II by taking a stand of our own—we
show the very real challenges to law presented by the Crick-Morse dichotomy.
With Crick and others, we argue that the former authority of our folk intuitions
must be ceded to conflicting findings in science. In defense, we show that
recent discoveries from cognitive neuroscience integrate with discoveries in
affective neuroscience, and, from those premises, we defend two claims:
(1) many human actions—those we intuitively judge to be evaluable in moral
and legal terms—are, as a matter of fact, causally influenced by affective
processes about which we cannot reason, precisely because those processes do
not rise to conscious awareness; and (2) some information about our affective
processes can rise to conscious awareness, but, even when that occurs, the
actual causes of our actions are liable to misinterpretation. We conclude that,
if either (1) or (2) is correct, assumptions at the core of our folk view of human
agency cannot be sustained. The shift in paradigm is profound indeed.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Folk psychology”1 is the basis of legal doctrine, and probably
deontological normative theory, too. Much of law and deontological moral
theory understand human agency in terms of beliefs, desires, and intentions
held by human actors, the subjects and objects of legal doctrine.2 But what if
1. “A term for people intuitively understanding and talking about human psychology. Humans have
an immediate understanding of themselves and other people.” René Rosfort, Folk Psychology, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCES AND RELIGIONS (Anne L.C. Runehov et al. eds., 2013); see also Ian Ravenscroft,
Folk Psychology as a Theory, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 16, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
folkpsych-theory/ (providing an overview of folk psychology).
2. This is not to say, of course, that significant portions of the law do not reflect consequentialist
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folk psychology (not a pejorative term) is wrong, or just incomplete?
Newtonian physics, by way of useful analogy, can get you through the day,
unless your day involves space travel or nuclear energy. If you do want to
travel in space or cause a nuclear reaction, you need relativity.3 Maybe there is
something more you would need to understand human agency if and when folk
psychology is insufficiently acute, where the broad strokes of belief, desire,
and intent fail. Neuroscience may provide that something more, and cognitive
psychology,4 certainly an aspect of neuroscience, may be to folk psychology
what Einstein’s relativity is to Newtonian physics. Law based on folk
psychology and its often-implicit deontology5 might be based on incomplete
conceptions of human agency. That would be significant, and problematic for
legal doctrine and normative theories of law based on such incomplete
conceptions.
Were there means to reconceive, to conceptualize more accurately, the
nature of human agency—what, in fact, it means to be human—then those
means would shift the paradigm,6 profoundly. We believe that law and legal
philosophy are at something of a precipice (more profound than a mere
crossroads), and that the challenge neuroscientific insights present to law may
well lead to changes in our understanding of morality as morality is reflected in
legal doctrine. The best evidence of that paradigm shift is found in a course
book, not a monograph or treatise. Professors Owen Jones, Jeffrey Schall, and
Francis Shen have assembled teaching materials that change the way we think
of the relationship between law and legal actors.7 They do not offer answers to
the crucial fundamental questions; they do much more: they formulate the
crucial questions in terms that resonate with the normative foundations of law;
they pose questions the law cannot (yet) answer, but surely must. Before their
important contribution to legal pedagogy, the questions were not asked and so
the consequences of their answers were latent.
In this Essay, written by a law professor and a philosophy professor, we
describe and appraise Law & Neuroscience (L&N).8 While we discuss the
scope of the book and its strengths as well as occasional weaknesses, our focus
is on its significance as well as the significance of the fact that the paradigm
intuitions. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 22, 2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/.
3. Markus Pössel, From E=mc2 to the Atomic Bomb, EINSTEIN ONLINE (2010), http://www.einsteinonline.info/spotlights/atombombe.
4. Cognitive psychology is the study of the brain and “higher mental processes such as attention,
language use, memory, perception, problem solving, and thinking.” Richard J. Gerrig & Philip G. Zimbardo,
Glossary of Psychological Terms, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/research/action/glossary.aspx
(last visited Feb. 18, 2017).
5. Deontological ethics or deontology is the normative ethical position that judges the morality of an
action based on the action’s adherence to a rule or rules. Rosalind Hursthouse & Glen Pettigrove, Virtue
Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Dec. 8, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/.
6. Thomas Kuhn explains the nature of “paradigm shifts” in the scientific world, where new
discoveries both change the mode of thinking of those engaged in science as well as leave unanswered
questions for future scientists to study. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
10 (3d ed. 1996).
7. OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY D. SCHALL & FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (2014)
[hereinafter L&N].
8. Id.
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shift effected by this book will be accomplished, largely, in the classroom. It is
in the classroom where (candor compels us to acknowledge) most legal
scholars and philosophers will have more impact than they will through any
number of articles or books they write for colleagues in their fields. Our
conclusion: Jones, Schall, and Shen will make law students and their
professors uncomfortable. Perfect.
In the parts of the Essay that follow, we consider the effectiveness of the
book in a separate law school course on Law & Neuroscience9 and in the
Philosophy curriculum.10 We take account of the ways in which the book
challenges the conceptual/empirical distinction (too often misunderstood)11:
are the limitations of the science a function of current (and remediable)
empirical shortcomings of the science or are those limitations a function of the
science’s failure to capture something about human agency that the science just
could not capture? We also touch, briefly, on what the book may reveal about
the impact of neuroscience on the so-called “naturalistic fallacy,” the way
“ought” may or may not be a reflection of the “is.”12 And, finally, we explore
the significance of neuroscience for conceptions of responsibility, in terms that
resonate with the normative calculus in the tort, contract, and criminal law
doctrine.
II. THE BOOK’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW
The law must make moral sense, and that is a simple matter of efficacy
wholly irrespective of whether legal doctrine vindicates something like natural
law (even assuming there is such a thing). One could understand law as the
social form of a normative elaboration: social interaction (the reason for and
context of law) is built on emotional reaction, heuristics that guide
interpersonal behavior.13 Visceral emotional reactions to inappropriate
violence, for example, are reified as moral imperatives (“thou shalt not kill”)
and ultimately codified in legal doctrine, which is able to distinguish murder
from other forms of homicide in order to vindicate normative conclusions that
promote the corporate welfare.14 That is a stark diagram of the dynamic, but it
distills the calculus into its essential constituents.15 That schematic also
9. Professor Alces has taught the Law & Neuroscience course as a law school course, once with a
preliminary draft of L&N and more recently with the first edition of L&N.
10. Professor Davies specializes in the philosophy of biology and psychology. For the past several
years he has been teaching and publishing on the implications of the sciences of the mind for theories of
responsibility. L&N is likely to serve as a valuable resource in his advanced seminars.
11. Though we are not yet willing to allow that there is a worthwhile distinction between the conceptual
and the empirical. See generally PAUL S. DAVIES, SUBJECTS OF THE WORLD: DARWIN’S RHETORIC AND THE
STUDY OF AGENCY IN NATURE (2009).
12. L&N, supra note 7.
13. For more on the notion that social interactions and law are based on heuristics and basic emotions,
see Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral
Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 830 (2001) and JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD
PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION (2013).
14. SARAH BROMBERG, THE EVOLUTION OF ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO CYBERNETIC ETHICS (2d ed.
1999).
15. See PETER A. ALCES, A THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS AND MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY 276 (2011) (“In order to reach a conclusion about the normative proclivities of legal doctrine, it

No. 1]

NEUROSCIENCE CHANGES MORE THAN YOU CAN THINK

145

emphasizes the mechanics of the calculus. There is not (or at least there need
not be) anything “real” in some divine or existential sense about the genesis of
human morality: it describes the rules, the expectations that accommodate
coexistence and thriving in a cooperative context. We are social, and the
continuum from emotional reaction to moral conclusion to legal doctrine is the
“is” that determines our sense of “ought.” For present purposes, though, it is
sufficient to recognize that evolutionary basis of law and morality, the morality
that matters to, that determines, law.
Emotional reactions, the precursors of morality, are the product of
predisposition, if not strictly “hard wired.”16 While there is some room for
cultural differentiation, for the most part, to be human is to admire what
humans admire (e.g., maternal love and devotion) and to abhor what humans
find loathsome (e.g., sexual abuse of children). It is not difficult to see,
drawing on those parenthetical examples, the very direct connection between
individual and group thriving, on the one hand, and our “natural” emotional
reactions, on the other. This is essentially similar to the basis of sexual
attraction: the same characteristics that make someone attractive to another are
the characteristics that generally confirm genetic fitness.17 But poems are not
written about genetic fitness, as such.
Once we understand the constituents of emotional reaction, we can
appreciate that morality may be empirical, that it may reduce to certain
fundamental properties. And we are, concomitantly, nothing more than the
sum of such fundamental properties, which, in turn, are nothing more (and
nothing less) than electrical, chemical, and structural incidents of our brains.
There is, at the end of the day, nothing about us that cannot be captured in such
empirical terms; there is no whole that is greater than the sum of its parts, no
matter how pleasant or reassuring it might be to imagine otherwise. But once
we understand human agency—and so human emotion, morality, and law—in
those empirical terms, what have we said about the law and about philosophy
that would make sense of responsibility within such a conception of human
agency? Jones, Schall, and Shen help us approach that question.
A.

Reconceptualizing Legal Doctrine

Neuroscience, at least the impact of neuroscience on conceptions of
human agency that matter to law, is something of a recent revelation: surely we
have known for thousands of years that we have brains, and that it is our brains
that define who we are as individuals and as a species. But it is only within the
last fifteen years or so that we have come to consider the impact that

is worthwhile (perhaps indispensable) to begin with a better understanding of moral reasoning . . . . Legal
doctrine is, after all, a way for humans to order normative relations. The only source for such legal morality
would be the human normative sense, and there is no obvious argument in favor of basing legal morality on
anything other than human morality, which is a product of our moral psychology.”).
16. Id. at 278, 288.
17. See Steven W. Gangestad, Sexual Selection and Physical Attractiveness, 4 HUMAN NATURE 205,
206–08 (1993) (suggesting that physical attractiveness and sexual selection are linked due to “good genes” and
one’s “investment potential” in a mate).
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neuroscientific insights might have on legal doctrine.18 And it was, not
entirely coincidentally, about fifteen years ago that functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) of the brain became more generally available19 on a
scale that accommodates the type of neuroscientific research that can reveal the
mind at work in ways that matter to the tort, contract, and criminal law (as well
as all of the other areas of law that are elaborations of the fundamental
premises formulated in those three primary doctrinal areas).
It is one thing to incorporate a “reasonable person” standard into the tort
law; it is wholly another to understand the neural constituents of that standard
in terms that may be revealed in fMRI images, images that depict the
perceptual and cognitive incidents of the decisions that lead to the behavior
that we might decide is negligent. The same is certainly true of the consent
criterion in contract law: once we appreciate what it means, at the neural level,
to conclude that there is the type of consent that will support the imposition of
contract liability—and can quite literally see the formation of consent20 (as
well as the impact of deception)—we recognize that the concept is a normative
conclusion rather than a simple empirical observation. In essence, we enforce
what some normative conception determines we should enforce, and cast that
conclusion in terms of “consent.” So deconstructed, the reality of consent, as
anything more than a normative conclusion designed to serve a normative
purpose, seems elusive.
Now, insofar as neuroscience investigates human agency at the neuronal
level, and endeavors to find the reasons for behavior in the operation and
cooperation of neural systems, its application to the inquiries particularly
pertinent to the criminal law would seem most obvious. It is already well
accepted that mental deficiency may mitigate, or obviate entirely, criminal
liability for some anti-social acts. The insanity defense21 is commonplace in
18. There is a history of neuroscience being used as evidence in the courtroom. The defense for John
Hinckley, the man who attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan, introduced a CAT scan in an
attempt to show his shrunken brain tissue, which can be an indicator of schizophrenia. Stuart Taylor, Jr., CAT
Scans Said to Show Shrunken Hinckley Brain, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/
02/us/cat-scans-said-to-show-shrunken-hinckley-brain.html; see also United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115
(D.C. Cir. 1982). In People v. Weinstein, a PET scan was admitted to show that the defendant, charged with
murder, had a cyst in his arachnoid membrane. 591 N.Y.S.2d 715, 716–17 (Sup. Ct. 1992). The defense
offered that as an explanation for Weinstein’s violence. Id. Recent developments such as fMRI have opened
more doors for neuroscientific evidence because the scans measure changes and patterns in brain activity. See,
e.g., Emily R. Murphy, No Lie MRI Being Offered as Evidence in Court, STAN. L. SCH.: L. & BIOSCIS. BLOG
(Mar. 14, 2009), http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/2009/03/14/no-lie-mri-being-offered-asevidence-in-court/ (reporting on child protection hearing in California where defense is planning on
introducing fMRI test findings as evidence of parent telling truth, arguing that “the fMRI-based lie detection
(or ‘truth verification’) technology is accurate and generally accepted within the relevant scientific
community . . . .”).
19. See Hannah Devlin et al., Introduction to FMRI, NUFFIELD DEP’T CLINICAL NEUROSCIS.,
https://www.ndcn.ox.ac.uk/divisions/fmrib/what-is-fmri/introduction-to-fmri (last visited Feb. 18, 2017)
(explaining the history of fMRI and its growing use in the early 1990s).
20. See, e.g., id. (explaining activation maps in fMRIs); Nat’l Inst. Biomedical Imaging &
Bioengineering, Imaging Technique Can See You Think, SCIENCEDAILY (Nov. 30, 2016),
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/11/161130144008.htm (describing new fast fMRI technique that
can be used to “see” human thought).
21. The M’Naghten Rule, applied to determine if a defendant should be found not guilty by reason of
insanity, asks first whether the defendant knew what he was doing, and then whether the defendant knew what
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popular depictions of the criminal law, and the U.S. Supreme Court has taken
into account neuroscientific insights in reaching important conclusions about
the culpability and punishment of adolescents and others whose intellectual
capacity is distinguishable from that attributed to “normal, healthy adults.”22
The imposition of criminal liability requires the coincidence of mens rea and
actus reus. Mental defect or deficiency may undermine the conclusion that a
defendant had the state of mind, the mens rea, necessary to impose criminal
liability.23
There are at least three aspects of state of mind (neural state) that may be
pertinent to the mental calculus determinative in the criminal law: (1) ability to
(a) distinguish right from wrong24 and (b) control one’s actions;25 (2) ability to
appreciate the connection between the act committed and the punishment
thereof;26 and (3) psychopathy, the neural state evidenced by the inability to
empathize, to feel the pain and fear of others (including one’s victims).27
Neuroscience can discover patterns of brain activity and structure that are
consistent with aberrational behavior.28 In fact, that can be done at an
impressive level of acuity; in theory, that may be done at the level of a single
neuron.29 When and whether the available imaging techniques will achieve the
he was doing was wrong. M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (HL). In contrast, the Model Penal
Code section concerning insanity provides: “[A] defendant is not responsible for criminal conduct where (s)he,
as a result of mental disease or defect, did not possess ‘substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.’” MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.03 (AM.
LAW INST. 1962).
22. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617–18 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that if adolescents
are mature enough to decide whether to have an abortion, then they are likely mature enough to be tried for the
death penalty); see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74–75 (2010) (holding that juveniles cannot be
sentenced to life without parole for non-homicide crimes).
23. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that Eighth Amendment prohibits State
from imposing death penalty on those who are insane).
24. See, e.g., Delling v. Idaho, 133 S. Ct. 504, 504 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The law has long
recognized that criminal punishment is not appropriate for those who, by reason of insanity, cannot tell right
from wrong.”).
25. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 598 (identifying “lack of control” as one reason “juveniles [may] be
forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment”).
26. See, e.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934–35 (2007) (“Gross delusions stemming from a
severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a link between a crime and its punishment in a context so far
removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose.”).
27. It is estimated that 10%–15% of criminal offenders are psychopaths, compared to only 1% of the
general population. See Robert Hare, Focus on Psychopathy, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (July 2012),
http://leb.fbi.gov/2012/july/focus-on-psychopathy; see also Paul Babiak et al., Psychopathy: An Important
Forensic Concept for the 21st Century, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (July 2012), http://leb.fbi.gov/2012/
july/psychopathy-an-important-forensic-concept-for-the-21st-century (noting that more men are psychopaths
than women). Psychopaths are characterized by both interpersonal traits, such as manipulativeness, lack of
empathy, and failure to accept responsibility or feel guilt; and affective traits, such as a lack of behavior
control, proneness to boredom, and shallow emotional affect. Kent A. Kiehl, A Cognitive Neuroscience
Perspective on Psychopathy: Evidence for Paralimbic System Dysfunction, 142 PSYCHIATRY RES. 107, 128
(2006).
28. See Kate Kelland, Study Finds Psychopaths Have Distinct Brain Structure, REUTERS (May 7, 2012,
4:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/07/us-brains-psychopaths-idUSBRE8460ZQ20120507
(detailing study that compared brain scans of criminals and found “the strongest evidence yet that psychopaths
have structural abnormalities in their brains”).
29. One such study observed the stimulation of single neurons in a live monkey as it performed goaloriented hand movements. Giuseppe Di Pellegrino et al., Understanding Motor Events: A Neurophysiological
Study, 91 EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN RES. 176 (1992); see also THOMAS Z. RAMSØY, INTRODUCTION TO
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level of acuity that will identify a particular behavioral anomaly with a
particular chemical, electrical, or structural state is a subject of both conjecture
and opinion.30 If it is just a matter of time and research before that would be
realized, then the limitations of the current science are empirical, and advances
in measuring techniques and devices may overcome empirical limitations. But
if there will still be a gap, some cause that will certainly evade measurement
no matter how sensitive our measurement techniques and devices, then the
insurmountable limitation would be “conceptual” rather than empirical: there
would be a gap there for which the science could not account, and there will, in
turn, be a limit to the impact neuroscience can have on law, or any theory of
human agency, for that matter.31
And if there is a causal factor for which neuroscience cannot account,
then there will be a dualism that materialism cannot deny. Now, that dualism
need not be the substance dualism of Descartes,32 but it would be a dualism
that would insulate fundamental conceptions of human agency—and in turn,
responsibility—from the empirical analysis and perspective of neuroscience.33
To date, the critiques of neuroscience, as it would be applied to law, have
posited such a dualism, even while denying doing so. Critics of the
neuroscientific perspective draw distinctions between the brain and the “human
being,”34 or the brain and “the person,”35 or, perhaps most typically, between
the brain and the mind.36 But, for materialists, for those most favorably
impressed by the neuroscientific perspective, there is no difference between the
brain and the human being (or the person), and mind is just a manifestation of
brain as fist is a manifestation of hand.37
So, how to address that fundamental disagreement in terms pertinent to
law?

NEUROMARKETING AND CONSUMER NEUROSCIENCE 66–67 (2014) (“[T]here are single cells within your own
head that respond ONLY to one particular item[.] About a decade ago, researchers at CalTech recorded the
activity of single neurons . . . while epilepsy surgery patients watched images of people, objects and places.
Here, they found one cell that responded only to Jennifer Aniston! Another cell only responded to images of
the Sydney Opera House, and yet another cell responded only to images of actress Hale [sic] Berry.” (citation
omitted)).
30. See generally MICHAEL S. PARDO & DENNIS PATTERSON, MINDS, BRAINS, AND LAW: THE
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 22 (2013) (detailing neuroscience imaging).
31. See id. (positing distinction between “conceptual” and “empirical”). But see DAVIES, supra note 11
(casting doubt on efficacy of such distinction).
32. Substance dualism is the notion that there are “two kinds of substance: matter, of which the
essential property is that it is spatially extended; and mind, of which the essential property is that it thinks.”
Howard Robinson, Dualism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 29, 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
dualism/.
33. Id.
34. M.R. BENNETT & P.M.S. HACKER, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE 3 (2003)
(“[Neuroscience’s] discoveries in no way affect the conceptual truth that these powers and their exercise in
perception, thought and feeling are attributes of human beings, not of their parts—in particular, not of their
brains.”).
35. PARDO & PATTERSON, supra note 30, at 22 (“[P]ersons are not their brains . . . .”).
36. Id.
37. Robinson, supra note 32.
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Presenting the Tension

Law & Neuroscience begins with that fundamental quandary by
juxtaposing two brief quotes, one from Francis Crick, winner of the Nobel
Prize in Medicine or Physiology,38 and one from Stephen Morse, Professor of
Law and of Medicine at the University of Pennsylvania.39 First Crick:
“You,” your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your
ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact
no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their
associated molecules. Who you are is nothing but a pack of
neurons . . . . [A]lthough we appear to have free will, in fact, our
choices have already been predetermined for us and we cannot
change that.40
Crick’s “astonishing hypothesis” is the materialistic, neuroscientific
conclusion: human agents are the sum of mechanical processes that are perhaps
more complex than any other machine so far developed (or of which we are
aware) but essentially no different from other systems. Professor Robert
Sapolsky has likened the human agent to a car41: just as you would not
“punish” your car when it does not start one cold morning by “sentencing” it to
the garage until it “learns its lesson,” it would be inefficacious to rely on
insubstantial and dualistic conceptions of human agency—perhaps informed
by folk psychological focus on beliefs, desires, and intent—to punish rather
than to discover the physical source of the problem, and all problems of human
behavior have a physical (neuronal) source that could only respond to a
physical (ultimately neuronal) solution.42
Juxtaposed with that perspective is the caution of Professor Stephen
Morse, perhaps the highest-profile critic of the neuroscientific materialistic
perspective:
Neuroscience has the potential to make internal contributions to
legal doctrine and practice if the relation is properly understood. For
now, however, such contributions are modest at best and
38. The prize was awarded to Francis Crick jointly with Maurice Wilkins and James Watson “for their
discoveries concerning the molecular structure of nucleic acids and its significance for information transfer in
living material.” The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1962, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.
org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1962/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).
39. L&N, supra note 7, at 3.
40. FRANCIS CRICK, THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR THE SOUL 3 (1994).
41. L&N, supra note 7, at 18.
42. See Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1787, 1794 (2004) (“Whereas it is true that, at a logical
extreme, a neurobiological framework may indeed eliminate blame, it does not eliminate the need for forceful
intervention in the face of violence or antisocial behaviour. To understand is not to forgive or to do nothing;
whereas you do not ponder whether to forgive a car that, because of problems with its brakes, has injured
someone, you nevertheless protect society from it.”); Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Mar. 11, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/magazine/11Neurolaw.t.html (quoting Robert Sapolsky:
“You can have a horrendously damaged brain where someone knows the difference between right and wrong
but nonetheless can’t control their behavior . . . . At that point, you’re dealing with a broken machine, and
concepts like punishment and evil and sin become utterly irrelevant. Does that mean the person should be
dumped back on the street? Absolutely not. You have a car with the brakes not working, and it shouldn’t be
allowed to be near anyone it can hurt.”).
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neuroscience poses no genuine, radical challenges to concepts of
personhood, responsibility, and competence.43
That assessment of the neuroscientific “state of the art,” as it were, is
somewhat obscure: is Professor Morse saying that the science should not
inform legal conclusions or that the science, in its current state, cannot, at least
effectively, inform legal conclusions? As a matter of fact, it would be
inaccurate to conclude that neuroscientific insights cannot impact the law:
there are already several examples of courts using neuroscience to determine,
at least in part, the results of important issues pertinent to the tort,44 contract,45
and criminal law.46 Now, it may be that courts, and the attorneys who frame
the issues for them, have been precipitous in their consideration of
neuroscientific evidence. And, indeed, there is some dubious science that even
the most enthusiastic supporter of the neuroscientific perspective would not
endorse.47 But those who practice, particularly those who litigate today and for
the foreseeable future, ignore the potential incorporation of neuroscientific
insights into legal argument at their peril.
If, however, Professor Morse is suggesting a more broad conclusion,
something more akin to the dualistic assertion that there is a crucial something
pertinent to normative (including legal) analyses that the materialism of
neuroscience simply cannot comprehend (this construction of his position
seems more in line with his assertions elsewhere),48 then he is not just
observing that the folk psychological perspective animates the law but that the
folk perspective must be the animating principle that makes sense of legal
doctrine.49 And it is not much of a leap, if a move at all, from the conclusion
43. Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation?: An Essay on Law and Neuroscience, in 13 LAW &
NEUROSCI.: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2010, at 529, 562 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011).
44. L&N illuminates areas where neuroscience has informed tort law’s distinction of “mental” and
“bodily” injury. See L&N, supra note 7, at 354–61.
45. L&N highlights the use of neuroimaging to discern whether an individual had capacity to contract.
See id. at 10–12 (reproducing the case of Van Middlesworth v. Century Bank & Trust Co., No. 215512, 2000
WL 33421451 (Mich. Ct. App. May 5, 2000)).
46. L&N treats at some length the Supreme Court’s use of neuroscience to evaluate the criminal law’s
treatment of juveniles. See L&N, supra note 7, at 72–100 (discussing Roper v. Simmons and Graham v.
Florida); id. at 569–78 (discussing Miller v. Alabama); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)
(“[A]s the scientific and sociological studies respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, ‘[a] lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are
more understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions
and decisions.’” (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68
(2010) (“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between
juvenile and adult minds.”); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 n.5 (2012) (“The evidence presented to
us in these cases indicates that the science and social science supporting Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions
have become even stronger.”).
47. Francis X. Shen & Owen D. Jones, Brain Scans as Evidence: Truths, Proofs, Lies, and Lessons, 62
MERCER L. REV. 861, 883 (2011) (discussing Cephos Corporation’s brain-based lie detection technology: “As
United States v. Semrau illustrates in the brain-based lie detection context, attempts to use brain scans in legal
contexts will often precede the full appropriateness of doing so.”).
48. As Professor Morse has stated, “Brains don’t kill people. People kill people.” Stuart Fox, Laws
Might Change as the Science of Violence Is Explained, LIVE SCI. (June 07, 2010, 4:44 AM),
http://www.livescience.com/6535-laws-change-science-violence-explained.html.
49. Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to
Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 2–4 (2008). Professor Morse writes:
Roughly speaking, the law implicitly adopts the folk-psychological model of the person, which
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that folk psychology is the foundation of legal doctrine to the conclusion that
deontological principles are, at least quite often, the foundation of legal
doctrine. That is, folk psychology, as a normative theory of law, depends on
the same principles as does deontological philosophy. So if folk psychology
fails to accurately capture the nature of human agency, so does deontology,
and the two together would fail as accurate, as complete and sufficiently acute,
conceptions of the relationship between human agents and legal doctrine.
The Crick-Morse dichotomy, then, is crucial. It presents the fundamental
tension that matters throughout the neuroscience-law dialectic. Presentation of
that persistent dialectic must be consistently considerate of what is at stake: the
normative foundation of law and human agency. Demonstrating the dynamic
in an accessible and compelling way would seem daunting. There is only so
much that can be done with the teaching materials normally incorporated in
law school course books. But here is where L&N shifts the paradigm: the
book presents the dynamic by maintaining the tension through the balanced
organization and presentation of accessible materials that are unsettling, and
unsettling in a pedagogically compelling way. You may not finish the book
with great confidence in either Crick’s enthusiasm (or resignation?) or Morse’s
skepticism, but professors and students who work through the book will never
think about the law, or human agency (for that matter), the same way again.
The book does what great teaching does: it changes the student, profoundly.
That sweeping conclusion requires elaboration.
C.

Through a Glass, Darkly

Maintaining focus on that fundamental normative tension in the course of
a survey of the areas of the law that might be affected by its resolution is
difficult and challenging for both professor and student. Organization can do a
great deal to juxtapose the (at least ostensibly) conflicting perspectives, and the
organization of L&N is strong. The first portion of the book, in particular,
presents the big normative question(s) and invites critical analysis of the
important distinctions and discontinuities.

explains behavior in terms of desires, beliefs and intentions. If practical reason plays no role in
explaining our behavior, as some neuroscientists and others claim, current responsibility doctrines
and practices would have to be radically altered or jettisoned altogether. I suggest, however, that the
conceptual and scientific support for this argument is thin at present and that there is good ground to
believe that our conception of persons as agents is unlikely to disappear. Consequently, legal and
moral doctrines that depend on agentic personhood are secure—at least for now.
....
Consciousness and action are central to the law’s view of the person. The capacity for intentional
activity or stillness—the capacity for agency—is a central aspect of personhood and is integral to
what it means to be a responsible person. We act because we intend. Responsibility judgments
depend on the mental states that produce and accompany bodily movement and stillness. This is
how we think about ourselves, and this is the concept of the person that morality and law both reflect.
The law’s view of the person is thus the so-called “folk-psychological” model: a view of the
person as a conscious (and potentially self-conscious) creature capable of practical reason, an agent
who forms and acts on intentions that are the product of the person’s desires and beliefs. We are the
sort of creatures that can act for and respond to reasons. The law properly treats persons generally as
intentional creatures and not as mechanical forces of nature.
Id. at 2–4.
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Neuroscience and the Individual

The editors use a compelling context—the murder of a spouse—to depict
the promise and limitations of neuroscience as it relates to individual brain
anomalies.50 That is, how should the law respond when an injury or disease of
the brain is apparently or actually the cause of an individual’s aberrational
behavior? Brain conditions that affect a particular individual rather than all
similarly situated members of a class (usually determined by reference to age
or gender, or some combination of the two) raise different issues (or similar
issues differently) from brain conditions that cut across all members of some
demographic group.
The challenge here in both settings is doctrinal as well as evidentiary.
Doctrinally, it is important to appreciate how the extant law can accommodate
analysis that takes normative account of behavior caused by a brain condition’s
impact on a particular individual’s behavior. The evidentiary question is
different: given the doctrine, how do advances in neuroscience confirm a
normatively (even morally) significant connection between a brain state or
condition and behavior (or state of mind) that the law regulates? Would
neuroscientific insights compel a change in doctrine or just an adjustment of
relevance and probity in the court’s evidentiary determinations? It is one thing
to admit an fMRI scan to establish that the defendant was capable or incapable
of a particular brain state; it is wholly another to conclude that such a brain
state is normatively significant, that it should or should not be determinative of
culpability or liability.
Chapter 2 of L&N describes the pertinence of neuroscientific evidence at
the individual level: did the cyst on the defendant’s brain cause him to murder
his wife and then try to cover it up as a suicide?51 The question here is not
whether those with brain lesions generally should be excused, whether they
should avoid the consequences of their actions; the question presented is
whether Mr. Weinstein52 may avoid criminal liability on account of the
arachnoid cyst covering a substantial portion of his frontal lobe.53 Now, we
could generalize from whatever conclusion we reach on those facts—all of
those with such brain anomalies have, at least, reduced criminal
responsibility—but that does not change the focus of this portion of the
materials: the question here is what the law should do with brain anomalies
that do not affect all members of a demographic group.

50. L&N, supra note 7, at 14.
51. Id. at 41–67.
52. Chapter 2 of L&N centers around discussions of Herbert Weinstein’s murder trial. Id. Weinstein
was accused of strangling his wife and throwing her from their high-rise apartment in an attempt to make the
death look like a suicide. People v. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
53. Arachnoid cysts consist of fluid-filled sacs located between the brain and the arachnoid membrane.
Arachnoid Cysts Information Page, NAT’L INST. NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS & STROKE, https://www.ninds.
nih.gov/Disorders/All-Disorders/Arachnoid-Cysts-Information-Page (last visited Feb. 18, 2017). The cysts
can appear visually ominous on a brain scan, obscuring large areas of the brain. The cysts, however, may
remain asymptomatic. Id. The danger in Mr. Weinstein’s case was that the cyst was putting pressure on
Weinstein’s left frontal lobe, an area controlling the brain’s executive functions. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d at
722.
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The problems with such individual brain anomalies are largely problems
of proof of causation, as the book well presents. Certainly the cyst looked
quite dramatic on the fMRI scan, but how can we have any confidence that the
cyst necessarily caused the behavior that the criminal law doctrine is designed
to police? Indeed, unless we fortuitously had a scan of Mr. Weinstein’s brain
at a time when he was acting perfectly normally, we could not connect the dots
from the problematic scan to the problematic behavior. That, though, is an
empirical question; and once we recognize it as such, we are assuming the
pertinence of it to the responsibility calculus: if we knew for a fact that Mr.
Weinstein would not have killed his wife but for the cyst, then would we still
impose criminal liability on him? If we did, what would we be punishing, Mr.
Weinstein or the cyst (which could, perhaps, be excised)? Presented that way,
the responsibility question in the context of individual brain anomalies
challenges, or provides the basis to challenge, extant doctrine. It also
juxtaposes the Crick and Morse view: if we are just the sum of neuronal
activity, and we can change that activity by adjusting the neurons, then there is
no other work for normative responsibility to do. But if, instead, per Morse,
“brains do not kill people; people kill people,”54 then Mr. Weinstein has no
defense. We could pay no attention to his claim that “my brain made me do
it.”55
2.

Neuroscience and the Group

While the use of neuroscientific insights has already been pertinent to
individual cases, as the neural function of particular individuals is concerned,
perhaps the more significant impact to date has been with regard to groups:
specifically adolescents. There is no question that the “teen years” (and
perhaps stretching well into the twenties) are a challenging time as the brain
develops the social sense that will, in the normal course, accommodate
successful adult interpersonal interactions.56 But a good deal is going on
within the developing brain: such as myelination of axons57 and pruning of
neuronal connections.58 Teenage brains have more neural connections than
adult brains59: but that is not a good thing. There are indeed too many
54. See Morse, supra note 49.
55. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
56. See Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, The Mysterious Workings of the Adolescent Brain, TED (June 2012),
http://www.ted.com/talks/sarah_jayne_blakemore_the_mysterious_workings_of_the_adolescent_brain
(discussing brain development and adolescent behavior).
57. Myelination involves insulation of the portion of the neuron that transmits neural (electrical)
messages. See Daniel Kantor et al., Myelin, MEDLINEPLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/002261.htm
(last updated June 1, 2015) (“Myelin is an insulating layer, or sheath that forms around nerves, including those
in the brain and spinal cord. It is made up of protein and fatty substances. This myelin sheath allows electrical
impulses to transmit quickly and efficiently along the nerve cells.”).
58. Synaptic pruning eliminates excessive synapses not being utilized. See Beatriz Luna et al.,
Maturation of Widely Distributed Brain Function Subserves Cognitive Development, 13 NEUROIMAGE 786,
791 (2001) (“Synaptic pruning and myelination during childhood and adolescence are important for enhancing
widely distributed brain functions by refining synaptic connections and enhancing the transfer of information
throughout the brain in a rapid manner.”).
59. See Debra Kelly, The Difference Between Teenage Brains and Adult Brains, KNOWLEDGENUTS
(July 25, 2014), http://knowledgenuts.com/2014/07/25/the-difference-between-teenage-brains-and-adult-
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connections, and some, many, of those must be pruned so that the important
connections that facilitate successful (i.e., socially acceptable and efficacious)
behavior will thrive.60 There is certainly sufficient behavioral evidence to
confirm that something is going on in the adolescent brain, and neuroscience is
able to confirm just what that something is.61
But myelination and neural pruning are processes and, as such, may
proceed at different rates in different people. While we might be able to look
at an fMRI of an adolescent brain and venture a judgment (guess?) as to how
“maturely” the adolescent with that brain structure would behave, we cannot
certainly determine social maturity by reference to such a scan. We could not
accurately predict the pace or eventual extent of development from such a scan
either.62 Brains are products of “nature” (i.e., genetic predispositions) and
“nurture” (i.e., environmental forces). So even if two brains started out
structurally identical (surely an impossibility), they would not mature in
precisely the same way, because they would necessarily be subject to different
environmental circumstances, and that is even true of identical twins raised in
the same home.63
It is difficult, then, even impossible, to accurately coordinate the law with
the mental ability of particular adolescents.64 We fix rules just short of the
point at which the cost of further precision in the rule’s application would be
greater than the social benefit realized from that precision. A gross example
would be the voting age: there are certainly sixteen-year-olds who have more
of the mental maturity (considering what all that might entail) necessary to
vote responsibly than some forty-five-year-olds, but we use the bright line,
eighteen years of age, as a certain and accessible determinant of the right to
vote.65 The cost of greater specificity would be too great to justify the costs
(including the political costs of purporting to make those judgments reliably).
For the most part, we are comfortable with rules that seem to come close
enough to the mark: eighteen for voting, sixteen for driving, and twenty-one
for drinking. But what if life and death are at stake?
brains/ (“In an adult brain, there are a number of neural connections that allow the different parts of the brain
to all work together. In the teenage brain, these connections aren’t fully formed yet . . . .”).
60. Sara B. Johnson et al., Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of
Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216, 217 (2009).
61. See Blakemore, supra note 56.
62. See Stephanie Burnett et al., The Social Brain in Adolescence: Evidence from Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging and Behavioural Studies, 35 NEUROSCI. & BIOBEHAV. REV. 1654, 1657 (2011),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4538788/ (“Whether these changes correspond to continuing
improvement in recognition accuracy for facial emotions, or to some other cognitive process, remains to be
determined experimentally.”).
63. See generally JUDITH RICH HARRIS, NO TWO ALIKE: HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN INDIVIDUALITY
(2006) (developing theory of human individuality).
64. Indeed, it is impossible to coordinate the law with any particular person. Professor Adam Kolber
notes that identical criminal sentencing can lead to disparate levels of punishment depending on the offender’s
baseline condition. Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1566
(2009) (“When we recognize the comparative nature of punishment, we see that, by putting two equally
blameworthy offenders in prison for equal durations, the offender with the better baseline condition is likely
punished more severely than the offender with the worse baseline condition.”).
65. Brandon Griggs, Should the U.S. Lower Its Drinking Age, CNN (Jan. 4, 2015, 10:15 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/16/us/legal-drinking-age/.
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The editors of L&N distinguish this group neuro-capacity issue from the
individual assessments made in cases such as Mr. Weinstein’s: the question is
different and the science is different. We can look at a brain scan of a broad
cross-section of adolescents and compare that with a brain scan of a broad
cross-section of adults and see significant differences that might well justify
substantial legal distinctions. But we neither know, nor even could know,
where a particular adolescent is on the developmental curve. The U.S.
Supreme Court has confronted this challenge in a line of cases considering the
normative significance of brain development revealed by advances in
neuroscience.66 L&N includes the central cases, and carefully collects and
edits the commentaries (legal and scientific) that have engaged the challenge.67
Can neuroscience support the conclusion that an adolescent who murders,
viciously and in cold blood, is not sufficiently mature, as a neural matter, to
receive capital punishment or life imprisonment, but is sufficiently mature to
make the decision about whether to have an abortion on her own, without
parental involvement?
We might conclude that those two ostensibly contradictory conclusions
are untenable, or we might not. We are used to drawing certain connections
that it seems rational, in our folk psychological estimation, to draw: maturity of
one kind, for one purpose and with regard to one question, would be a reliable
indicator of maturity of other kinds, for other purposes and with regard to other
questions. But cognitive psychology may draw distinctions where folk
psychology cannot, and the distinctions that cognitive psychology will
recognize may have salience so far as the normative balance struck by legal
doctrine is concerned. If we recognize that the decision whether to kill in cold
blood as part of a teenage escapade is neurologically different from the
decision to have an abortion,68 we might well conclude that a sixteen-year-old
is competent to make one decision, and suffer the consequences therefor, but is
66. See supra note 46 (discussing L&N’s treatment of Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and
Miller v. Alabama); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (stating that death penalty for offenders
under eighteen unconstitutional); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (stating that offenders under eighteen
at time of crime cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for non-homicide
crimes); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (stating that mandatory life sentence without possibility of
parole for juvenile offenders is unconstitutional).
67. See L&N, supra note 7, at 72–74, 84–87, 96–98 (providing excerpts from Brief for the American
Psychological Association, and the Missouri Psychological Association as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Letter to E. Joshua Rosenkrantz from Developmental
Neuroscientists (July 16, 2009); Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric
Association, National Association of Social Workers, and Mental Health America in Support of Petitioner,
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida,
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765 (2011); Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal
Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006)).
68. See L&N, supra note 7, at 579–82 (providing excerpt of Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents
Less Mature Than Adults?: Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA
“Flip-Flop”, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 593 (2009)); see also Steinberg et al., supra, at 593 (“In our view,
then, the seemingly conflicting positions taken by APA in Roper v. Simmons (2005) and Hodgson v.
Minnesota (1990) are not contradictory. Rather, they simply emphasize different aspects of maturity, in
accordance with the differing nature of the decision-making scenarios involved in each case. The skills and
abilities necessary to make an informed decision about a medical procedure are likely in place several years
before the capacities necessary to regulate one’s behavior under conditions of emotional arousal or coercive
pressure from peers.”).
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not similarly able to make the other decision. So, then, it may be entirely
consistent, and correct, as a matter of cognitive neuroscience, to proscribe
imposition of capital punishment for the adolescent who murders in cold
blood69 but permit the adolescent to make the decision to have an abortion
without parental notification.70 That is, what seem to be two iterations of the
same question71 may in fact be significantly different in light of cognitive
neuroscientific insights. And once that distinction is established empirically,
certainly coherent legal doctrine, at least normatively coherent legal doctrine,
would reflect that distinction. Now, there may well be other political, social,
or behavioral reasons or evidence that would support such a distinction as well,
but it would seem that the neuroscientific support would be at least as, and
perhaps more, fundamental than alternative bases.
That confluence of considerations signals the paradigmatic shift, a shift
demonstrated by the materials collected in and the presentation of L&N. The
breadth and level of inquiry at this juncture in the book is profound. Indeed, in
this part of the book and in the many others like it,72 you get the very real sense
that the normative ground is shifting under your feet: the law will now have to
ask new questions, or at least the familiar questions in new ways, in order to
vindicate the normative coherence and integrity of the doctrine. Folk
psychology can take us, has taken us, only so far. And often, folk psychology
suggests inconsistencies—such as the proscription of capital punishment for
adolescents on account of their intellectual and emotional immaturity but
vindication of minors’ right to abortion without parental consent—that
cognitive neuroscience can reconcile.

69. See L&N, supra note 7, at 74–84 (excerpting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)). The
defendant in Roper, seventeen at the time of the crime, planned the murder in advance:
In chilling, callous terms he talked about his plan, discussing it for the most part with two
friends, Charles Benjamin and John Tessmer, then aged 15 and 16 respectively. Simmons
proposed to commit burglary and murder by breaking and entering, tying up a victim, and
throwing the victim off a bridge. Simmons assured his friends they could “get away with it”
because they were minors.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 556. The Court proscribed the death penalty for offenders under eighteen years old at the
time of the crime. Id. at 578.
70. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 450 (1990) (“[T]he requirement that both parents be
notified, whether or not both wish to be notified or have assumed responsibility for the upbringing of the child,
does not reasonably further any legitimate state interest.”).
71. Or so they seemed to Justice Scalia. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 617–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting). His
dissent pointed out that the American Psychological Association had taken, what Justice Scalia characterized
as, inconsistent positions in Roper and Hodgson:
As petitioner points out, the American Psychological Association (APA), which claims in this
case that scientific evidence shows persons under 18 lack the ability to take moral responsibility
for their decisions, has previously taken precisely the opposite position before this very Court.
In its brief in Hodgson v. Minnesota, . . . the APA found a “rich body of research” showing that
juveniles are mature enough to decide whether to obtain an abortion without parental
involvement. The APA brief, citing psychology treatises and studies too numerous to list here,
asserted: “[B]y middle adolescence (age 14–15) young people develop abilities similar to adults
in reasoning about moral dilemmas, understanding social rules and laws, [and] reasoning about
interpersonal relationships and interpersonal problems.”
Id. (citations omitted).
72. See L&N, supra note 7, at 591–626 (discussing addiction); id. at 335–52 (neuroimaging and pain);
id. at 353–55 (blurring of tort law’s mental versus bodily injury distinction).

No. 1]

NEUROSCIENCE CHANGES MORE THAN YOU CAN THINK

D.

157

The Persistent Challenge

Notwithstanding L&N’s presentation of the promise (or, at least,
potential) of neuroscience to impact the law (both the pertinent evidence and
the doctrine), the editors are very careful throughout to take account of the
limitations of the current science, as well as the ways in which a little bit of
knowledge may be a dangerous thing. Chapter 9 of the book follows the two
chapters in which the editors present the science: a succinct primer on the brain
(Chapter 7) and a survey of current imaging techniques (Chapter 8). The third
chapter in that scientific triptych surveys the limitations of extant techniques
and technologies both independently and in relation to one another. The
presentation demonstrates how complementary use of different techniques may
overcome the limitations of any one73 but also candidly describes what the
science just cannot (yet) do.74 This acknowledgement of the state of the
science is perfectly calibrated to discourage too much enthusiasm but also to
propose something of an agenda: we learn what the science cannot (yet) do and
how those deficiencies matter to reevaluation of the normative coherence of
extant doctrine.
Though there certainly is reason to believe that there may be too much
enthusiasm too soon for what neuroscience may accomplish, we would dismiss
its challenge to the normative assumptions of legal doctrine at our peril. L&N
quite well describes the limitations of the science but also treats the limits of
the limits,75 so to speak. It is crucial that we know just what the science cannot
do so that we will have a better sense of what it can do and what we need to
refine before we can make more confident assumptions about human agency
that would be crucial to the normative calculus.
The brief survey of L&N’s method developed in this Part supports the
important fundamental inquiry that challenges law’s normativity. It is to that
73. See id. ch. 8 (discussing advantages of each technology).
74. See, e.g., id. at 254–61 (discussing limitations of fMRI); id. at 250–53 (limitations of
electroencephalography); id. at 225 (limitations of MRI); id. at 226 (limitations of Diffusor Tensor Imaging).
L&N also provides an informative excerpt from Owen Jones et al., discussing some of the limitations of fMRI.
See id. at 247–50 (reproducing in part Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5 (2009)).
75. See id. at 504–09 (providing alternative perspectives on the limitations and future admissibility of
brain-based lie detection in the courtroom). An excerpt from Frederick Schauer notes that fMRI, though
flawed, may be more reliable than juries:
In law as in science, “compared to what?” is an important question. . . . Currently the jury or
judge (when there is no jury) determines if witnesses are telling the truth. . . . [J]uries rely on
numerous myths, urban legends, and pop psychology with little reliability. They distrust
witnesses who perspire, fidget, and fail to make eye contact, and trust those who speak
confidently while looking directly at them.
Id. at 505 (excerpting Frederick Schauer, Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and the Law, 14 TRENDS COGNITIVE
SCI. 101 (2010)). Henry Greely, however, argues for regulation of the sale of lie detection devices:
A better solution, both for courts and more generally, would be to pass federal legislation
requiring FDA-like regulation of all lie-detection drugs and devices . . . . We should prohibit
the sale, marketing, distribution, or use of lie detectors until they have proven, by rigorous trials,
to be safe and effective. . . . Should any improvement over a veteran FBI investigator, an
experienced judge or a careful lay observer, be sufficient? . . . The correct answers are not
obvious.
Id. at 507–08 (excerpting Henry T. Greely, Premarket Approval Regulation for Lie Detections: An Idea Whose
Time May Be Coming, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 50 (2005)).
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challenge, and L&N’s treatment of it, that we now turn.
III. PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
From a philosophical perspective, the most important part of L&N is Part
2: “Brain, Behavior, and Responsibility.” This is where students of human
nature will want to dig deepest, for it is where the book addresses the relevance
of neuroscience to our understanding of human agency—of rationality, of
decision making and action, of moral and legal responsibility. This will be the
focus of the remainder of our review.
The heart of Part 2 is Chapter 5, “Behavior and Responsibility: Views
from Law and Neuroscience.” This chapter offers a range of views concerning
the correct relationship between law and neuroscience. At one extreme,
philosopher Hilary Bok argues that neuroscience has no bearing on whether we
have free will or whether we are morally responsible.76 At the other, biologist
Jerry Coyne argues that free will, understood as the ability to act otherwise, is
ruled out by the laws of physics, which in turn rules out moral responsibility.77
Between Bok and Coyne lie a handful of views, most of which are
conciliatory. Most aspire to preserve a modest form of responsibility despite
the threats posed by neuroscience to our understanding of agency.
For us, most of the views in Chapter 5 fail to appreciate the radical
implications of neuroscience for the law. We suggest that, as the paradigm
continues to shift, future editions of L&N will need to expand the range of
views in Chapter 5 to include these radical implications. In defense of our
view, we begin with the naysayers, with those who deny the importance of
neuroscience for understanding human agency and responsibility. After
explaining why those views fail to appreciate the unsettling implications of
recent findings in neuroscience, we turn to theorists who aspire to preserve a
relatively modest form of responsibility, and we explain why we think even
those views do not go far enough. We conclude with the suggestion that our
view captures the spirit and much of the letter of the biological behavioral
model defended in an excerpt incorporated earlier in Part 2 (in Chapter 4) by
Owen Jones and Timothy Goldsmith.78
A.

Compatibilism and Folk Psychology: The Naysayers

Hilary Bok is a compatibilist concerning freedom of will.79 Even if
metaphysical determinism is true—even if every event, including every
decision and action, is necessitated by the conjunction of prior events and the
laws of nature80—still, some decisions and actions are nonetheless free. How

76. Id. at 130–32.
77. Id. at 129–30.
78. Id. at 107–17.
79. Russell Blackford, Hilary Bok on Free Will, TALKING PHIL. (Apr. 2, 2012), http://blog.talking
philosophy.com/?p=4568.
80. This is roughly the definition given by van Inwagen. See Peter van Inwagen, The Incompatibility of
Free Will and Determinism, 27 PHIL. STUD. 185, 198 (1975).
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can that be?
In the short selection included in Chapter 5, Bok’s argument for
compatibilism goes something like this:
P1: In some cases, a person’s actions depend on her choices, where
those choices entail the existence of alternative actions.81
P2: Some actions do in fact depend on prior choice.
C1: Therefore, for some choices, there exist alternative courses of
action.82
P3: If, in choosing between alternatives, a person steps back and
produces a reasoned choice, the resulting choice and action are
free.
P4: In some cases, persons do step back and produce reasoned
choices between alternatives.
C2: Therefore, some actions are the result of a free choice (or a free
will).83
For our purposes, the crucial claim is that, in some cases of deliberation, a
person is “capable of stepping back from her existing motivations and habits,
and making a reasoned decision among [alternative courses of action].”84 If
that capacity for reasoned decision making obtains, then, “according to
compatibilists, she [the agent] is free.”85 This is Bok’s fourth premise.
That premise is crucial in two ways. First, it appears to conflict with
Bok’s main thesis concerning the irrelevance of neuroscience to free will. For,
according to Bok, free will requires the capacity to “step back” from our
motivations and habits (presumably to tamp down the effects of our passions
and prejudices), and the capacity to reason about how to act.86 But that means
free will requires a host of specific psychological capacities. If neuroscience
were to discover that, contrary to appearances, humans do not possess those
capacities, then Bok’s compatibilism would fail. More precisely, Bok’s
compatibilism is plausible only if we discover that the psychological capacities
required by her theory are in fact implemented in the nervous system of
organisms like us.
81. The alleged entailment in P1 is conceptual: if some event is a choice, then, given the meaning of
“choice,” that event involves the ruling out of alternative actions in favor of the action performed, in which
case alternatives must exist.
82. Although our focus is Bok’s fourth premise, skepticism concerning P1 (and thus C1) must be noted.
Suppose determinism is true—suppose, à la van Inwagen, that every event, including every action, is
necessitated by the conjunction of past events and the laws of nature. (That determinism might be true is, of
course, a supposition that all compatibilists allow.) Then, for any “choice” we seem to make, there is one and
only one available course of action. Hence, if determinism is true, genuinely alternative actions are
metaphysically impossible. Bok of course knows this. That is why she insists on a strong distinction between
the theoretical point of view—the perspective from which we comprehend the possible truth of determinism—
and the practical point of view—the perspective of the active agent who must decide how to act. This is also
why Bok insists on the primacy of the practical in questions of free will and responsibility. See HILARY BOK,
FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 100 (1998). As will become clear, however, we do not think the theoreticalpractical distinction can bear the weight of Bok’s argument.
83. L&N, supra note 7, at 130–32.
84. Id. at 131.
85. Id.
86. See BOK, supra note 82, at 119.
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Second, we should be skeptical of Bok’s compatibilism and, indeed, any
form of compatibilism.87 As we describe below, there exists compelling
evidence that we are not the kinds of organisms that compatibilist theories
require. We are not, in particular, capable of rational deliberation in ways
required for the attribution of responsibility.
Now, consider the well-known views of legal theorist Stephen Morse.
Like Bok, Morse is a compatibilist who believes free will is irrelevant to
responsibility or, more narrowly, to legal responsibility.88 Unlike Bok,
however, Morse does not think the presumed truth of compatibilism can
establish the irrelevance of neuroscience to our view of ourselves as
responsible agents.89 To the contrary, Morse grants that neuroscience could
undermine our present view of ourselves.90 But he also insists that, to date, it
has not done so.91
Morse’s view boils down to three assertions. There is, first, a more or
less specific view of persons built into the very fabric of criminal law, namely,
the view provided by our folk psychological intuitions.92 Second, according to
our folk view, persons are responsible insofar as they are capable of engaging
in practical reason93 and acting on the basis of its deliverances.94 Third, to
date, neuroscience has discovered nothing to suggest that we are not possessed
of that capacity:
Given how little we know about the brain-mind and brain-action
connections, to claim based on neuroscience that we should radically
change our picture of ourselves and our practices is a form of
87. Consider, for example, neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga’s endorsement of a compatibilist view
(also represented in Chapter 5). He claims that “brain determinism has no relevance to the concept of
personal responsibility,” and, moreover, that “responsibility exists at a different level of organization: the
social level, not in our determined brains.” L&N, supra note 7, at 133–34. Now, the excerpt from Gazzaniga
is too brief to do justice to his larger view. Yet, the flavor of his remarks prompts us to observe that, in light of
the evidence described below, moving from the neural to the social level in no way diminishes the threats
posed by neuroscience to responsibility. How could it, if all our social attachments are mediated by our
nervous systems, if all social relations are relations between nervous systems, especially between brains?
Since neuroscience might discover that we lack the capacities required for responsibility in our social relations,
the brain-based threat to responsibility remains. That social relations are neural relations is a view developed
in recent work in social neuroscience, the progeny of a mating between social psychology and cognitive
neuroscience. For an overview, see Dylan Wagner et al., The Representation of Self and Person Knowledge in
the Medical Prefrontal Cortex, in 3 WILEY INTERDISC. REV. COGNITIVE SCI. 451 (2012).
88. Morse, supra note 49, at 2.
89. See L&N, supra note 7, at 123.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 128.
92. Id. at 123 (citing Stephen J. Morse, Neuroscience and the Future of Personhood and Responsibility,
in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds.,
2011)) (“Criminal law presupposes a ‘folk psychological’ view of the person and behavior.”); see also Michael
S. Moore, Responsible Choices, Desert-Based Legal Institutions, and the Challenges of Contemporary
Neuroscience, 29 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 233, 237–44 (2012); Michael S. Moore, Libet’s Challenge(s) to
Responsible Agency, in CONSCIOUS WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY: A TRIBUTE TO BENJAMIN LIBET 207 (Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel eds., 2011).
93. We unpack the relevant notion of practical reason in the next section.
94. Here are two excerpts from Morse’s contribution to Chapter 5: “[T]he law’s view is that people are
capable of acting for reasons and are capable of minimal rationality according to predominantly conventional,
socially constructed standards.” L&N, supra note 7, at 124. “The general capacity for rationality is the
primary condition for responsibility and the lack of that capacity is the primary condition for excusing a
person.” Id. at 125. For further instances of the same claim, see Morse, supra note 49.
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neuroarrogance. . . . There is little reason at present to believe that
we are not agents.95
Well then! Thanks to Bok and Morse, readers of L&N are confronted
with a lovely challenge. Is it true that there is “little reason” (Morse) or no
reason (Bok) to believe that neuroscience undermines the view we have of
ourselves as rational and thus responsible agents? Is Morse right that the
balance of scientific evidence supports the folk view of humans as possessed
of a general capacity for practical rationality?
Are we guilty of
“neuroarrogance” if we claim otherwise? We think the answer to all three
questions is “no,” and shall explain why.
B.

Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience

Our explanation is too complex to reproduce here in full, as it appeals to a
convergence of evidence from several disciplines. We can, however, point to a
few significant discoveries and then describe one way those discoveries
converge on a conclusion that threatens our view of ourselves as practically
rational and thus morally and legally responsible. For concreteness, we focus
on criminal responsibility. We assume, along with Morse and our alleged folk
intuitions, that a person is criminally responsible only if her action was uncoerced and only if she was capable of rational, practical deliberation prior to
her action. But what is rational, practical deliberation? And what capacities
are integral to it?
Although philosophical theories of practical reason are as diverse as they
are legion,96 the myriad subtleties do not matter here. The following model
suffices for our purposes: if an agent has goal G—if he is motivated to bring
about G—and if the agent believes he can bring about G by performing action
A with equal or greater efficiency than other available actions, then, if he is
rational, and if he has no contravening goals stronger than G, he will infer that
he ought to do A.
Suppose you have the goal of deciding whether to adopt L&N as the text
for a course you are scheduled to teach. Suppose your goal is to decide
whether L&N is sufficiently interdisciplinary for your purposes. Suppose
further that, to your delight, you just learned that a review of that book by a
legal theorist and a philosopher is available! You now have, let us assume,
strong motivation to track down and read our review. Suppose you also know
the most efficient ways to obtain a copy of our review. Then, if you are
rational, and if you do not have a stronger goal which conflicts with your
obtaining a copy of our review, you will infer from the conjunction of your
motivation and knowledge that you ought to perform those actions.
We assume that, in order to instantiate this overly simple model of

95. L&N, supra note 7, at 128.
96. For helpful overviews of recent philosophical theories of practical reason, see R. Jay Wallace,
Practical Reason, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Mar. 26, 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practicalreason/ and Elijah Millgram, Practical Reason and the Structure of Actions, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May
11, 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason-action/.
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practical reason, the rational deliberator must possess the following minimal
capacities:
(1) The capacity to know and understand facts relevant to the
action;97
(2) The capacity to be motivated to perform, and also to not
perform, the action;98
(3) The capacity to assign evaluative weights to the competing
actions;99 and
(4) The capacity to reason from one’s knowledge and motivation
to the conclusion that one ought to perform the action or to the
conclusion that one ought to refrain.100
In addition, practical reasoning requires that the agent be:
(5) Responsive to reasons (motivations) that play a causal role in
one’s decisions and actions.
If we draw inferences from premises that do not refer to the causes of our
action, then we are not really reasoning about our action. We might be
concocting a rationale for acting—a story to tell if called upon to say why we
acted as we did—but insofar as our rationale fails to specify the factors that in
fact caused us to act, it is at best a rationale for an action we did not perform.
In many instances, of course, people wholeheartedly believe the rationales they
give for their actions even when the rationales are false. But, we take it as
obvious that something can be a reason for an action only if it is among the
causal factors for that action. That is a point on which Morse agrees.101
If those requirements are indeed necessary for practical reason, and if
practical reasoning is required for responsibility, then evidence that we lack
one or more of those capacities would show that our view of responsibility is
under threat. More precisely, if the evidence shows that we lack those
capacities under normal conditions in day-to-day living—the conditions under
which most attributions of legal responsibility are made—then the threat to
responsibility is substantial.
Such evidence, we will now argue, is indeed available and rests upon the
integration of recent discoveries in cognitive neuroscience and affective

97. Including the fact, in the criminal law context, that the proposed action is illegal and may result in
the loss of one’s liberties.
98. If we are not motivated at a time to perform two or more distinct actions—for example, to perform
and to not perform the illegal action—our deliberative capacities would not kick in.
99. If we are incapable of comparing what we take to be the immediate or long-term consequences of
performing two or more distinct actions, we can hardly be said to be deliberating.
100. If we are incapable of inferring from relevant premises (relevant knowledge and motivation) to a
practical conclusion (a specific action), then, while we may be engaged in some sort of mental activity, we are
not engaged in practical reasoning.
101. See Morse, supra note 49, at 19 (“At present, the law’s ‘official’ position—that conscious,
intentional, rational and uncompelled agents may properly be held responsible—is justified unless and until
neuroscience or any other discipline demonstrates convincingly that humans are not the creatures we think we
are. That is, if humans are not conscious and intentional creatures who act for reasons that play a causal role
in our behavior, then the foundational facts for responsibility ascriptions are mistaken.” (emphasis added)).
That is also a point on which philosophers disagree. For further discussion, see Wallace, supra note 96 and
Millgram, supra note 96.
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neuroscience. The integration of these discoveries supports two crucial claims.
First, many actions are causally influenced by affective processes about which
we cannot practically reason, precisely because the affective processes do not
rise to conscious awareness. Second, some information about our affective
processes can rise to conscious awareness, but when this occurs, the
information sometimes fails to represent the actual causal processes
involved.102 Such integration, we contend, casts doubt on the assumption that
we are equipped with the capacities for practical reason itemized in (1)–(5)
above.103
We begin with Jaak Panksepp, the father of affective neuroscience.104
Panksepp hypothesizes that there exists in all of us an ancestral mammalian
mind implemented in sub-cortical processes.105 Three features of this ancestral
mind are crucial. It is constituted by relatively primitive affective capacities,
and it is endogenous and autonomous. It is endogenous in that it comprises a
set of capacities that do not require any learning for their operations. It is
autonomous in that its operations require no signals or feedback from cortical
capacities.106
The evidence for Panksepp’s ancestral mind is extensive. We will
mention just three considerations. First, the endogenous nature of our subcortical affective systems can be illustrated by the FEAR system.107 FEAR can
102. Although the discussion in L&N focuses on a range of information from cognitive neuroscience, we
suggest that, as the paradigm continues to shift, future editions will need to incorporate discoveries in affective
neuroscience, including the ones discussed below.
103. A fuller explanation of the importance of integrating cognitive and affective neuroscience is given
in a different context—a discussion of neuro-interventions—in Paul S. Davies, Foundational Facts for Legal
Responsibility: Human Agency and the Aims of Restorative Neuro-Interventions (forthcoming).
104. Panksepp’s discoveries of the sub-cortical systems that comprise our ancestral minds date back to
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. See, e.g., Jaak Panksepp & Jay A. Trowill, Intraoral Self-Injection I & II, 9
PSYCHONOMIC SCI. 405, 407 (1967); Jaak Panksepp et al., Modulation of Hypothalamic Self-Stimulation and
Escape Behavior by Chlordiazepoxide, 5 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 965 (1970); Jaak Panksepp et al., The
Biology of Social Attachments: Opiates Alleviate Separation Distress, 13 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 607
(1978); Jaak Panksepp & William W. Beatty, Social Deprivation and Play in Rats, 30 BEHAV. & NEURAL
BIOLOGY 197 (1980); Jaak Panksepp, Toward a General Psychobiological Theory of Emotions, 5 BEHAV. &
BRAIN SCI. 407 (1982); Jaak Panksepp, Mood Changes, in HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL NEUROLOGY 271 (P.J.
Vinken et al. eds., 1985); Jaak Panksepp, The Anatomy of Emotions, in EMOTION: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND
EXPERIENCE VOL. III. BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EMOTION 91 (Robert Plutchik ed., 1986); Jaak Panksepp,
Toward a Neuro-Cognitive Psychology of Emotions, 32 CONTEMP. PSYCHOL. 799 (1987) (book review). The
first truly comprehensive statement of his theory is in his 1998 book, AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN AND ANIMAL EMOTIONS. For an updated statement of his theory, see JAAK
PANKSEPP & LUCY BIVEN, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF MIND: NEUROEVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF HUMAN EMOTIONS
(2012).
105. See JAAK PANKSEPP, AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN AND ANIMAL
EMOTIONS 41–59 (1998). See also Panksepp’s many journal publications in which he presents his view, for
example, Jaak Panksepp, On the Embodied Neural Nature of Core Emotional Affects, 12 J. CONSCIOUSNESS
STUD. 158 (2005); Jaak Panksepp, Cross-Species Affective Neuroscience Decoding of the Primal Affective
Experiences of Humans and Related Animals, PLOS ONE (Sept. 2011), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/
file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0021236&type=printable.
106. We borrow the terms “endogenous” and “autonomous” from WILLIAM BECHTEL, MENTAL
MECHANISMS: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE (2008). To the best of our
knowledge, Panksepp does not use these specific terms, but Bechtel’s usage is apt for describing Panksepp’s
view.
107. See PANKSEPP, supra note 105, at 51. Panksepp uses uppercase lettering to designate the subcortical affective systems he has discovered and to highlight his claim that the functional effects of these
systems do not map neatly onto our folk psychological emotional categories. The functions fulfilled by the
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be triggered in rats by an external stimulus, such as a well-placed tuft of cat
fur,108 or an internal stimulus, such as a well-placed electrical current.109
Indeed, if we stimulate any of the brain areas involved in fear—the central and
medial amygdala, the medial hypothalamus, or parts of the brain stem—the
animal will freeze at low levels of current and try to flee at higher levels, and it
will exhibit autonomic responses typical of fear.110 This holds for rats, cats,
and every mammal species tested thus far.111
Second, Panksepp’s primary-process systems are not only endogenous
but also autonomous. This is clear from experiments in which the entire cortex
of an infant mammal is surgically removed and the animal is raised along with
its intact siblings.112 Rough and tumble play, for instance, is a vital form of
social interaction, and the play behavior of decorticated rats is difficult to
distinguish from those whose brains are intact.113 As Sergio and Vivien Pellis
put it, “Play fights that involve decorticated rats are just as intricate, sustained,
and repeated as those of intact rats, with escalation to serious fighting being
rare. Together, these properties suggest that even without a cortex, such rats
are capable of the reciprocity necessary to sustain playfulness.”114 Although
they go on to identify two age-related differences that occur in male
decorticated rats, differences that depend on cortical structures,115 Pellis &
Pellis, along with Panksepp and his collaborators, are clear that crucial
emotional and social capacities are effectively implemented in sub-cortical
structures and do not depend for their operations on any cortical structures.116
Third, and crucially, these endogenous, autonomous sub-cortical systems
do not only exist in non-human mammals. They exist in us as well. We know
this in part because sub-cortical systems in humans are functionally

FEAR system, for instance, do not overlap the full range of instances in which we, on the basis of our folk
psychological heritage, would apply the vernacular term “fear.” Panksepp puts it this way: “[Uppercase
lettering is used] to alert the reader to the fact that I am using the term in a scientific rather than simply a
vernacular way: I am talking about a specific neural system of the brain that is assumed to be a major source
process for the emergence of the related vernacular terminologies but which in the present context has a more
clearly restricted neuro-functional referent.” Id.
108. Id. at 18.
109. Id. at 213.
110. Id. at 215–16.
111. Id. at 206–24; PANKSEPP & BIVEN, supra note 104, at 175–202. In addition to discovering the subcortical FEAR system, Panksepp has discovered six other sub-cortical affective systems, including FEAR,
RAGE, LUST, CARE, GRIEF, PLAY, and SEEKING. See generally PANKSEPP & BIVEN, supra note 104, at
175–202. He describes these systems as “primary-process” affective systems, where a system is primary if it
is endogenous or built into the structure of the brain. Id. It is worth emphasizing that six of Panksepp’s seven
systems fulfill functions that are largely social.
112. PANKSEPP, supra note 105, at 291; Jaak Panksepp et al., Effects of Neonatal Decortication on the
Social Play of Juvenile Rats, 56 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 429 (1994).
113. PANKSEPP, supra note 105, at 291; Panksepp et al., Effects of Neonatal Decortication, supra note
112; SERGIO PELLIS & VIVIEN PELLIS, THE PLAYFUL BRAIN: VENTURING TO THE LIMITS OF NEUROSCIENCE
(2010).
114. PELLIS & PELLIS, supra note 113, at 48.
115. Id. at 51.
116. This is not to deny that cortical structures interact with sub-cortical structures in intact organisms;
surely, they do. What is clear is that the sub-cortical capacities of these animals are sufficient on their own for
a range of emotional and social competencies. Hence our claim that such systems are not only endogenous,
but autonomous as well.
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homologous with those in other mammals.117 But we also know this from the
study of human children born with little or no cortical tissue. Bjorn Merker
describes a three-year-old girl born with very little in the way of functioning
cortical tissue.118 He describes the child’s brain this way: “[s]pared
ventromedial occipital and some midline cortical matter overlies an intact
cerebellum and brainstem, whereas the rest of the cranium is filled with
cerebrospinal fluid.”119 Merker goes on to point out that remnants of cortical
tissue in anencephalic children typically develop no radiating connections to
mid- and lower-brain structures and, in addition, may be found on autopsy to
be gliotic.120 Such remnants are likely possessed of little or no function.121
Yet, in a pair of contrasting photos included in Merker’s discussion, we
see the young girl, Heather Joy, just as her father is setting her baby brother on
her lap, followed by her reaction a second or two later as she feels the weight
and warmth of her brother. In the first photo, Heather has a look of wide-eyed
expectancy; in the second, we see what appears to be an expression of intense
pleasure, even joy.122 At the very least, she appears to be experiencing an
affective state with a very positive valence.123
The case of Heather Joy, along with similar cases documented by Alan
Shewmon and colleagues,124 exemplify the autonomy of our sub-cortical
affective capacities. We see in Heather a pronounced affective reaction to a
familiar stimulus125 (perhaps the feel, smell, and sound of her infant brother),
and we see in the children studied by Shewmon a range of discriminatory,
emotional, and social capacities, as well as a capacity for associative learning,
all implemented sub-cortically.126 These are capacities that demonstrably
operate in the absence of information from cortical structures. This, then, is
some of the evidence for Panksepp’s ancestral mind. It is evidence that the
brains of all humans comprise an ancestral, affective brain nestled beneath our
modern cortical structures, implementing a mind that causally influences our
discriminatory, emotional, and social capacities whether we realize it or not.
At the same time, however, we know from Stanislas Dehaene’s theory of
consciousness that emotional capacities implemented in sub-cortical
structures—including the primary process systems discovered by Panksepp—
cannot rise to conscious awareness: not directly, at any rate.127 Since our
argument rests upon an integration of Panksepp and Dehaene, we pause to
117. PANKSEPP & BIVEN, supra note 104, at 1–6.
118. Bjorn Merker, Consciousness Without a Cerebral Cortex: A Challenge for Neuroscience and
Medicine, 30 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 63, 78, fig.8 (2007).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 78.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 79, fig.9.
123. Id.
124. D. Alan Shewmon et al., Consciousness in Congenitally Decorticate Children: Developmental
Vegetative State as Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 364, 364–74
(1999).
125. Merker, supra note 118, at 79.
126. Shewmon et al., supra note 124, at 364–70.
127. Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache, Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness: Basic
Evidence and a Workspace Framework, 79 COGNITION 1, 12–15 (2001).
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outline Dehaene’s theory.
Dehaene studies a specific kind or level of conscious awareness, what he
calls “consciousness-as-reportability”—a form of consciousness minimally
required to give reasons for our actions and, therefore, to engage in practical
reasoning.128 Dehaene’s central hypothesis is that this form of awareness is
implemented in a complex and dynamic set of cortical structures.129 The main
components of his model are threefold. First, the human cortex comprises a set
of functionally distinct areas, some more or less localizable, others
distributed.130 Each of these areas is functionally specialized; each receives a
specific range of information as input, processes that information, and sends
the results to other brain areas.131 One such area is the global workspace—the
second main component in Dehaene’s model.132 The workspace receives
signals from functionally specialized brain areas and “broadcasts” them; it
functions as a kind of central switching station, making incoming signals
available to other specialized areas capable of receiving and processing
them.133 The auditory cortex, for example, receives information produced by
perceived speech sounds, processes that information, and sends the results to
the workspace where they are broadcast and perhaps received by other areas—
including, in some instances, Broca’s area—where further processing may
result in a verbal response to the perceived speech sounds.134
The third component is a top-down attention mechanism capable of
amplifying a proper subset of signals that reach the workspace. When that
mechanism amplifies a given signal, and if that amplification crosses a certain
threshold, a self-sustaining processing loop will emerge.135 The content of the
amplified signal then becomes the object of conscious awareness.136 In
addition, the amplified signal is broadcast to other specialized areas, and when
those other areas receive the amplified signal, their activity will typically
increase, thereby expanding the scope of conscious awareness.137
On this model, there are several ways a neural signal can fail to rise to
conscious awareness. For our purposes, the most decisive way is architectural.
When a specialized brain area bears no architectural connections to the
workspace, its outputs have no chance of rising to conscious awareness138: at

128. See id. at 1–37; Stanislas Dehaene et al., Toward a Computational Theory of Conscious Processing,
25 CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY 76, 76 (2014).
129. Dehaene & Naccache, supra note 127, at 12–29.
130. Id. at 12–13.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 12–15, 24–29.
133. Id.
134. Although Dehaene & Naccache do not give this specific example, it clearly illustrates the first two
components of their view, and it is consistent with their remarks about speech production, which in turn
illustrate their claims concerning the anatomy of consciousness. See id. at 26–28.
135. Id. at 15.
136. Id.
137. This point is clear from Dehaene & Naccache’s discussion of attentional amplification and, in
particular, from their claim that “[i]t is the style of activation (dynamic long-distance mobilization), rather than
its cerebral localization, which characterizes consciousness.” Id. at 14–15.
138. For discussion of this crucial point, see id. at 15–22 (describing how when a specialized brain area
bears no architectural connections to workspace, its outputs have no chance of rising to conscious awareness).
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least not directly. What might rise to awareness are the downstream somatic
effects of that area. Dehaene offers the following example: “[T]he activity of
many neurons, for instance in subcortical and brainstem nuclei, is excluded
from conscious mobilization (e.g., circuits for respiration or emotion). In
many cases we become aware of those circuits only through their indirect
effects on other representations, such as in somatic cortical areas.”139 On this
model, emotional or affective capacities implemented in sub-cortical areas
cannot rise directly to conscious awareness, due to the very architecture of the
brain.140 At most, the causal effects of these capacities may rise to awareness,
but only indirectly.
To appreciate the indirectness involved, consider the comparison to
respiration. Our myriad respiratory processes never send signals to the global
workspace. We become aware of respiratory distress only after the fact—we
experience shortness of breath, for instance, only after we have been running
for several seconds. The same is true, according to Dehaene & Changeux, of
our sub-cortical affective processes.141 Signals from those affective systems
never reach the workspace.142 Instead, a sub-cortical system such as FEAR
might produce a set of somatic changes. If those somatic changes produce
cortical representations that are broadcast to the global workspace, then we
will likely become conscious of those somatic changes. What comes to
awareness are not outputs from the FEAR system, but representations of
somatic changes, and insofar as these representations are ambiguous—insofar
as, for example, tightness in the chest is symptomatic of processes other than
fear—they require interpretation.
Here, then, is our integration of affective and cognitive neuroscience: If
Panksepp is correct, our ancestral affective mind animates all our deliberations,
decisions, and actions. Our primary-processes affects are causal factors for
most, if not all, our actions.143 If Dehaene is right, none of our ancestral
affective processes rise to conscious awareness; none has a direct route to
awareness.144 At best, sub-cortical affects with sufficient strength produce
downstream effects that might rise to awareness, and those effects are subject
to interpretation (more on this presently).145 With this integration before us, let
us now consider just two consequences, both of which cast doubt on the
assumption that we are endowed with the minimal capacities for practical
reason itemized above.
The first consequence is simple but important. Consider sub-cortical,
affective processes that produce downstream somatic effects too weak to reach
the global workspace. Consider, for instance, the non-conscious effects of
low-level anxiety, stress, fear, frustration, anger, depression, lust, etc. These
139. Stanislas Dehaene & Jean-Pierre Changeux, Neural Mechanisms for Access to Consciousness, in
THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 1145, 1148 (Michael S. Gazzaniga et al. eds., 3d ed. 2004).
140. Id. at 1148–49.
141. See Dehaene & Naccache, supra note 127, at 15–18 (describing indirect nature of awareness).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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effects no doubt influence our moods, motivations, decision making, and
actions in myriad ways we fail to notice.146 Being too weak to reach the
workspace, they nonetheless shape our psychology in ways that are difficult to
discern from the first-person perspective, that is, from the perspective of
consciousness-as-reportability.147
It is worth noting, moreover, that the effects of low-level, non-conscious
processes on our decisions and actions are abundantly confirmed by
experiments in cognitive and social psychology.148 And when we combine
such evidence from psychology with the above integration of affective and
cognitive neuroscience, we are faced with a convergence of evidence that, in a
wide range of cases, we are indeed moved by affective processes about which
we have no reportable conscious awareness.149 There exist affective factors
that contribute to our decisions and actions, about which we cannot practically
reason.150 Such decisions and actions, therefore, are beyond the pale of
responsibility, on the folk psychological assumption that we are responsible for
actions performed as a consequence of practical reason.
The second consequence, though less straightforward, is also of
considerable importance. Consider sub-cortical effects strong enough to reach
the global workspace. Despite reaching conscious awareness, the role of such
effects in practical reason is fraught with difficulties, the most obvious being
that they may amount to a form of internal coercion.151 The root worry is that
we must interpret affective effects that come to awareness before we can
employ them in our practical reasoning, and when our interpretations are
incomplete or erroneous, the practical conclusions drawn may fail to track the
actual causes of our action.152 When this happens, when our explicit reasons
for acting are not among the actual causes, our action is due to factors outside

146. See infra note 148.
147. Id.
148. In one study, for instance, Piotr Winkielman et al., exposed subjects subliminally to either a happy,
neutral, or angry face, followed by a masking stimulus. Piotr Winkielman, et al., Unconscious Affective
Reactions to Masked Happy Versus Angry Faces Influence Consumption Behavior and Judgments of Value, 31
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 121, 122–35 (2005). Immediately after the mask, some subjects were
asked to rate their mood on a short survey (to determine whether their conscious feelings had been altered by
the subliminal prime) and then given a fruit beverage to drink. Id. at 124. Subjects were free to pour and drink
as much beverage as they liked, and the quantity consumed by each subject was monitored. Id. at 125. The
other subjects were given a limited quantity of the same fruit beverage and asked to rate how well they liked it.
Id. at 124. They were then given the same short survey to determine their consciously reportable feelings. Id.
This study produced two important findings. First, the ratings of the fruit beverages correlated positively with
the type of face to which they had been subliminally exposed. Id. at 132. Those exposed to a happy face rated
the beverage higher than those exposed to an angry face. Id. Second, the conscious feelings reported by
subjects did not correlate with the type of face subliminally perceived. Id. Those exposed to a happy face
reported conscious feelings indistinguishable from those exposed to an angry face. Id. This study thus
demonstrates that a stimulus of which we have no awareness can causally influence our affective processes in
ways we do not consciously notice, even though the alterations in our affective processes exert a demonstrable
causal effect on our judgments and our actions. See id. Subjects exposed non-consciously to a happy face
judged differently (they rated the fruit beverage differently) and acted differently (they consumed more of the
fruit beverage) than those exposed to an angry face. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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our deliberative field.153 Such actions result from factors we can neither resist
nor endorse precisely because we have no awareness of their efficacy.154 In
such cases, responsibility for our actions is attenuated on the same grounds that
we withhold responsibility for actions due to compulsion.155
Consider, for instance, cases in which sub-cortical fear produces tightness
in the chest, sweaty palms, heightened sensory acuity, and so on. If those
symptoms are broadcast in the workspace, might they figure in our practical
reasoning as required by conditions (1)–(5)? Yes, but only if they are first
interpreted. Reasoning from downstream somatic effects of our affective
processes is not the same as reasoning from our affective processes.156 We
need some way to interpret those somatic effects, some means with which to
assign them a motivational value. We need to establish that, for any given set
of somatic effects, they reliably indicate the causal efficacy of such-and-such
sub-cortical affective system.
But we have no such reliable method. We have inferences to what may
appear to be the best explanation, but in fact we have no reliable grounds to
distinguish correct from incorrect inferences.157 This is so, at any rate, for a
non-trivial range of cases.158 To see why this is so, recall Michael Gazzaniga’s
split-brain subjects.159 We can be confident, in light of Gazzaniga’s
experiments, that the following partial model of our practical reasoning
capacities is highly plausible:
The Neural-Damage-Deprivation Model of Giving Reasons:
Whenever our left hemisphere operates in the absence of causally

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Compare Dehaene & Changeux, supra note 139, with Winkielman, et al., supra note 148.
157. For a classic illustration of the unreliability of such inferences, see Stanley Schachter & Jerome
Singer, Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State, 69 PSYCHOL. REV. 379 (1962).
158. Some inferences to the best explanation are more plausible than others. When the situation is
relatively simple, our inference might be reliable or, more modestly, it might be reasonable to assume that they
are reliable. Of course, the notion of “relative simplicity” is horribly vague, though it is clear enough in
certain cases. As social psychologist Timothy Wilson suggests: “It might be difficult to discern how the deepseated facets of our personality have shaped our behavior, but easier to tell that we are angry at John for
forgetting our dinner date, sad because we just heard that our grandmother is ill, or nauseous because we just
ate an entire bowl of clam dip.” TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE
ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS 98 (2002). More generally, “the causal interpretive system [the psychological
system by which we discriminate between events that are causally related and events that are not] . . . works
best when the situation is relatively simple and unambiguous, rendering the possible causes of one’s action few
in number and transparent in character.” DAVIES, supra note 11, at 146.
159. See Michael S. Gazzaniga, Cerebral Specialization and Interhemispheric Communication: Does the
Corpus Callosum Enable the Human Condition? 123 BRAIN 1293 (2000). In one well-known split-brain
experiment, see id. at 1316, distinct visual information is fed to each hemisphere. The right hemisphere, for
example, receives information about a snow scene, while the left receives information about a chicken. The
subject is then presented with an array of objects visible to both hemispheres, and is asked to choose any
objects from the array relevant to what he saw in the previous step. Using his right hand, he points to a
chicken claw; using his left, he points to a snow shovel. Finally, the subject is asked to justify his selection of
objects. Of course, his left hemisphere knows nothing about the snow scene; it knows nothing of the actual
cause of his selecting the snow shovel. And now it needs to make sense of having just selected a shovel
despite being utterly clueless of the actual cause. Since most of the subject’s linguistic capacities are
implemented in his left hemisphere, those capacities have no choice but to confabulate. They invent a
“reason” for choosing the snow shovel that at least coheres with having also selected the chicken claw.
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relevant information isolated outside the left hemisphere (i.e., in the
right hemisphere), it invents a “reason” for the agent’s action based
on whatever information it can access.160
Yet, if this model is plausible, it should be easy to generalize to a model with
much greater scope, a model that applies to all persons:
The Structural-Deprivation Model of Giving Reasons: Whenever
our conscious, reason-giving capacities operate in the absence of
causally relevant, non-conscious information, or in the presence of
indirect, conscious information, they invent a “reason” for the
agent’s action based on whatever information they can access.
The Structural-Deprivation Model is compelling because, in one crucial
respect, we are all like Gazzaniga’s subjects. His subjects, as a result of
surgery, were deprived of any architectural connections between the two
hemispheres.161 If Dehaene and Panksepp are right, virtually all persons are
constituted by an ancestral brain nestled inside modern cortical capacities,
where the ancestral brain bears no architectural connections to our capacity for
consciousness-as-reportability.162 The point is not that the direct connections
have been surgically destroyed; the point is that they never evolved in the first
place.163
Given the non-existence of such architectural connections, the best we
can do is interpret the indirect effects of our sub-cortical capacities. The best
we can do is what Gazzaniga’s subjects did: concoct an explanation by trying
to make sense of the information that happens to be available.164 Of course,
there is information available besides the felt downstream effects. There is
information about the immediate environment, patterns of past behavior,
recollections of past interpretations, etc. Yet, these additional forms of
information were also available to Gazzaniga’s subjects. And yet, based on all
available information, those subjects wove a coherent interpretation of their
actions that was nonetheless false.165 The point, of course, is that the
information available to those subjects was critically incomplete and critically
ambiguous.166
Since we, like Gazzaniga’s subjects, are faced with the task of making as
much sense as possible of information that is incomplete, or ambiguous, or
both, we must accept that, in such cases, our interpretations have the same

160. Id. at 1319–20.
161. Id. at 1295.
162. Just to be clear: we are not asserting our ancestral brain bears no connection to our neo-cortex. That
would be silly. The claim is that our sub-cortical emotions bear no direct connection specifically to our
capacity for consciousness-as-reportability.
163. See Davies, supra note 103 (discussing the importance of the Structural-Deprivation Model).
164. Gazzaniga, supra note 159, at 1316.
165. Id.
166. In one experiment, the subject’s left-hemispheric linguistic capacities had no access to information
in the right hemisphere about a perceived snow scene. Id. As a result, the left hemisphere had no idea—none
at all—why the subject’s left hand pointed to a snow shovel. Id. This perceptual information—the left hand
pointing at a snow shovel—illustrates what we mean by “critically ambiguous” information. For discussion of
this particular experiment, see MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE MIND’S PAST 24–26 (1998) and Gazzaniga, supra
note 159.
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status, namely, interpretations that may feel utterly correct from the firstperson perspective, but that nonetheless may be partially or wholly mistaken.
Short of subjecting ourselves to controlled experiments, such inferences are, at
bottom, hunches or guesses for which we have no generally reliable method of
confirmation. From the first-person perspective—the perspective from which
we engage in practical reasoning—we are faced, in a non-trivial range of cases,
with an impressive bit of self-ignorance.
This form of interpretive self-ignorance gives rise to the second important
consequence of our integration. On Morse’s view, and as described above,167
the reasons one employs in one’s practical inferences must be among the actual
causes of our actions. If you reason to some action on the basis of reasons that
misrepresent the actual causes, then your conscious reasoning was, in part or in
whole, causally irrelevant to the performance of that action.168 In such a case,
the factors that actually caused you to act were outside your field of
deliberative awareness.169 They were akin to a form of internal coercion, since
you, the “conscious decision maker,” were impotent with respect to them.
In cases such as this, attributions of criminal responsibility are out of
place. The folk intuitions that lead us to withhold responsibility in instances of
coercion should likewise lead us to withhold it here. Therefore, except when
we have reasonable evidence that the agent’s expressed reasons match the
actual causes of her actions, we are in no position to claim that folk
psychological conditions for criminal responsibility are met.
We conclude, therefore, that the Bok/Morse attempt to ground
responsibility in practical reasoning conflicts with what is implicit170 in
knowledge derived from affective and cognitive neuroscience. The balance of
evidence derived from the above integration is that we do not possess some of
the required capacities for practical reason. The causal effects of our ancestral
minds on our actions, combined with the architectural and interpretative
limitations of conscious awareness, suggest that we are not the kind of
organisms required by compatibilist theories of free will or by our folk view of
our own agentive capacities.171 And this discovery is of great significance to
current conceptions of legal responsibility and, more generally, to all of the
law.
C.

Thin Responsibility vs. Utilitarian Punishment?

Some authors excerpted in Chapter 5—authors who, like us, insist on the
relevance of neuroscience to free will and responsibility—wish to defend a

167. See especially condition (5), supra text accompanying notes 97–101, in our list of conditions
required for practical rationality.
168. See Morse, supra note 49, at 20 (“Whether one explains action causally or holistically, the theory of
action presupposes that it is a person that acts based on the person’s desires, beliefs, and intentions.”).
169. Id.
170. And now made explicit in the above integration.
171. This is why we claim (in our introduction) that, as the paradigm continues to shift, future editions of
L&N will need to expand the views represented in Chapter 5 to include the more radical implications of
progress in neuroscience, including the implications of the integration described herein.
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notion of responsibility that is far less robust than the ones endorsed by Bok
and Morse.172 The excerpt from Patricia Churchland is illustrative.173 She
suggests that the traditional debate on free will should be replaced with a
neuroscientifically informed study of the differences between persons with
normal control of themselves and persons with comprised control.174 And, in
the final paragraph of her excerpt, Churchland seems to endorse the
preservation of some notion of responsibility: “So is anyone ever responsible
for anything? Civic life requires it be so. . . .”175 Another illustration is the
view proposed by Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen.176 They criticize
libertarian notions of free will and retributivist views of punishment, and
plump for a compatibilist view of free will and a consequentialist view of
punishment.177 And they seem to think that these latter two views enable them
to preserve a thin but nonetheless important notion of responsibility.178
Both these views reject retributivist theories of punishment and instead
endorse a consequentialist theory.179 In addition, both wish to preserve
responsibility, on the grounds that some concept of responsibility is required
by consequentialist theories of punishment.180 Civic life requires attributions
of responsibility, according to Churchland, presumably because it is correct to
say that persons with normal capacities of self-control are sometimes
responsible for their actions.181 Greene & Cohen are more explicit.182 In their
view, “we can say that the actions of rational people operating free from
duress, etc. are free actions,” and, in consequence, that such persons can
properly be held responsible.183
If so—if Greene & Cohen and Churchland wish to preserve a thin notion
of responsibility—we think they should reconsider. Two points are relevant.
First, consequentialist theories of punishment do not require any attributions of
responsibility. A nice example from Derk Pereboom makes this point: many
believe that some cases of forced quarantine are justifiable on consequentialist
grounds.184 Returning soldiers or health workers who might be carrying a
communicable disease capable of triggering an epidemic may, with sufficient
172. L&N, supra note 7, at 130–32 (Bok); id. at 123–28 (Morse).
173. Id. at 134.
174. Id. at 135.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 134–44.
177. Id.
178. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything,
359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775, 1783 (2004), reprinted in L&N, supra note 7,
at 142 (“The vindication of responsibility in the absence of free will means that there is more than a grain of
truth in compatibilism. . . . [W]e will want to distinguish the various classes of people who cannot be deterred
by the law from those who can. . . . We will also recognize familiar justifications such [as] those associated
with crimes committed under duress . . . . [W]e can say that the actions of rational people operating free from
duress, etc. are free actions, and that such people are exercising their free will.”).
179. Id. at 1775–76.
180. Id. at 1776, 1783.
181. Patricia Churchland, The Big Questions: Do We Have Free Will?, NEW SCIENTIST (Nov. 15, 2006),
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19225780-070-the-big-questions-do-we-have-free-will/.
182. Greene & Cohen, supra note 178, at 1775–76, 1778.
183. Id. at 1783.
184. See DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL 174 (2001).
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justification, be deprived of their liberties for a circumscribed period of time.
Even against their will. This justification holds despite the fact that the
persons forced into quarantine cannot be said to be responsible in any moral or
legal sense for the fact that they might be carriers of a deadly agent. If so, if
the loss of liberties can be justified without the attribution of moral or legal
responsibility, then, on our understanding of their views, neither Churchland
nor Greene & Cohen have adequate grounds on which to preserve any notion
of moral or legal responsibility.
Our second point is that, on the view defended in this review, all
compatibilist theories of free will and responsibility are difficult to square with
the implications of the integration of Panksepp and Dehaene. As we saw in
Bok’s view, the heart of any compatibilist theory is the assumption that we are
capable, in some range of conditions, of practical reason sufficient for moral
responsibility. Our integration of Panksepp and Dehaene calls this assumption
into question. If we are correct, then the attribution of responsibility to persons
whose actions can be regulated with incentives may be no more apt than
attributions to those whose actions must be regulated in some other way.
D.

Practical Reason from a Biological Point of View

As suggested by Jones & Goldsmith in Chapter 4, if the law’s concept of
the person is informed mainly by our folk psychological concepts, then it is
profoundly incomplete and probably mistaken in substantive ways.185 What is
missing is the biological point of view. Indeed, insofar as we are products of
evolutionary history, we should see ourselves and all our psychological
capacities in precisely that light. We should accept as our default position that
there is no such thing as a psychological capacity that is not a biological
capacity. This, we surmise, is part of the paradigm shift suggested by Jones &
Goldsmith’s claim that the law must be informed by the findings of behavioral
biology.186
It thus is no accident that, of all the authors represented in Chapter 5, the
biologist’s view appears closest to ours. Coyne asserts the non-existence of
free will and moral responsibility, and although he endorses a system of
rewards and punishments, he refrains from insisting that a consequentialist
system of punishment somehow saves responsibility.187 Exactly so.
Perhaps more than any other theorist represented in Chapter 5, Robert
Sapolsky clearly endorses the Jones & Goldsmith behavioral biological
model.188 Sapolsky describes neuroscientific evidence for two crucial claims.
The first is that there are persons capable of knowing that a given action is
illegal or otherwise wrong, but who suffer from an organic impairment in their
capacity for volitional control.189 The second is that impairments in volitional
185. L&N, supra note 7, at 107–17.
186. See Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
405, 418 (2005) (discussing irrational behavior and decision-making processes).
187. L&N, supra note 7, at 129–30.
188. Id. at 142–47.
189. Id. at 145.
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control fall on a continuum and may be pervasive across large swathes of the
human population.190 You fall somewhere on this continuum, as do we. If so,
the doubts raised above concerning our capacities for practical rationality are
confirmed. In addition to our integration of Panksepp and Dehaene, it may be
a pervasive fact that we are not the kind of organisms presupposed by our
traditional views of responsibility. It is thus difficult to overstate the
importance of the biological point of view for properly assessing our folk
psychological assumptions about ourselves.
Indeed, Sapolsky’s claim that we can have knowledge that fails to
connect to our affective and motivational capacities is an important extension
of our integration of Panksepp and Dehaene.191 Sapolsky gives evidence that
we often “know” things—believe them at the level of conscious awareness—in
such a way that the relevant beliefs do not engage our affective capacities.192
This provides yet another reason why the views of practical reason
presupposed by Bok, Morse, and others fail to apply to organisms like us, at
least for a range of conditions under which we must deliberate and act in our
daily lives. No doubt the view endorsed by Bok and Morse proceeds from the
conceptual categories bequeathed to us by our cultural (mostly theological?)
predecessors. But it is not a view that will survive further neuroscientific
inquiry.
IV. CONCLUSION
We began this Essay with the suggestion that L&N signals, even
encourages, a paradigm shift in the sense that Thomas Kuhn understood
dramatic shifts in scientific inquiry proceed. It is when the existing paradigm,
or conventional thought, begins to fail that there is room, indeed, real need for,
a new paradigm that can make sense of the anomalies that emerge under the
old paradigm. “Folk psychology,” and its relationship to the deontological
basis of legal doctrine, is an old paradigm that has begun to show its age, and
disutility, as anomalies emerge across the fundamental doctrinal categories: In
tort law, the doctrine fails to recognize the fundamental affinity of physical and
so-called “mental” or emotional harm,193 and pain remains a mystery for which
the doctrine can only temperamentally account.194 Neuroscience reveals that
190. Sapolsky, supra note 42, at 1794, reprinted in L&N, supra note 7, at 146 (“There is little support
for the idea that over the range of PFC [prefrontal cortex] function, there is a discontinuity, a transition that
allows one to dichotomize between a healthy PFC in an individual expected to have a complete capacity to
regulate behaviour, and a damaged PFC in someone who cannot regulate their behaviour. The dichotomy does
not exist.”).
191. Cf. Dehaene & Naccache, supra note 127; PANKSEPP, supra note 105; Sapolsky, supra note 42
(examining how recently discovered neurobiological processes explain non-normative human behavior).
192. Davies, supra note 103, refers to such knowledge as “action-irrelevant,” that is, knowledge that is
causally impotent with regard to the specific action despite being consciously grasped by the agent.
193. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 48 cmt. g
(AM. LAW INST. 2012) (“The law of negligence has never applied the ordinary rules of foreseeability to
emotional harm. . . . [A]s a matter of policy [emotional harm] is an injury whose cost the legal system should
not normally shift . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (categorically
denying recovery for negligently caused emotional injury without accompanying bodily harm).
194. Compare KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 65 (4th ed. 2012)
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all injury is ultimately physical; all pain has a physical correlate and can only
be appreciated and appraised in terms of brain states.195 The criminal law
doctrine depends on conceptions of retribution that result in the generation of
more crime and greater, unnecessary human suffering; the growing disquiet
with mandatory sentencing signals the emergence of that anomaly.196 And
even in contract law, where consent has done the normative heavy lifting for
hundreds of years, cracks in the edifice are emerging: it just makes no sense to
talk in terms of consent to “agreements” designed to discourage real
understanding.197
Even if Kuhn overstates the impact of paradigm shift in the history of
science, new paradigms emerge when the discovery of anomalies in the
accepted way of thinking begin to compromise the explanatory power of the
accepted wisdom:
Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the
recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced
expectations that govern normal science. It then continues with a
more or less extended exploration of the area of anomaly. And it
closes only when the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the
anomalous has become the expected. Assimilating a new sort of fact
demands a more than additive adjustment of theory, and until that
adjustment is completed—until the scientist has learned to see
nature in a different way—the new fact is not quite a scientific fact
at all.198
And that is where the debate, the tension, is now: has neuroscience revealed a
new “science” of law?
While it is unusual to write an essay reviewing a law school course
book,199 we believe that the significance of L&N and neuroscience for the
study of law and its normative foundations (also often the focus of
undergraduate and graduate philosophy courses) makes it important, even vital,
that the law and philosophical academies take account of the challenge
presented by this new paradigm. L&N is not flawless: we have suggested
(“[M]ental infirmities are invisible, hard to measure, and incompletely verifiable.”), with Tor D. Wager et al.,
An fMRI-Based Neurologic Signature of Physical Pain, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1388, 1394 fig.2B (2013)
(suggesting that fMRI data can validate self-reports of pain).
195. Luis R. Valadez, Is Pain Real or Is It All in Your Head? Neuroscience Explains, LEARNING MIND
(July 21, 2014), http://www.learning-mind.com/is-pain-real-or-is-it-all-in-your-head-neuroscience-explains/.
196. Greene & Cohen, supra note 178, at 1775–76.
197. See generally OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN
CONSUMER MARKETS (2012); OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014); MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012); Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine
Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014); Symposium,
“Boilerplate”: Foundations of Market Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 821 (2006).
198. KUHN, supra note 6, at 52–53.
199. But see Margaret S. Bearn, Cases and Materials on Remedies, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 196 (1982)
(reviewing EDWARD D. RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES (1982)); Douglas Laycock, A Case Study in
Pedagogical Neglect, 92 YALE L.J. 188 (1982) (reviewing RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., TEACHING MATERIALS
ON COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW (3d ed. 1981)); J.S. Waterman, Cases on Federal Jurisdiction and
Procedure, 14 TEX. L. REV. 128 (1935) (reviewing ARMISTEAD M. DOBIE, CASES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION
AND PROCEDURE (1935)).
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where future editions might focus and expand the inquiry, and we would each
adjust and perhaps supplement the materials to better meet pedagogical goals
in the courses we teach. But L&N is more than a tentative beginning: it marks
a sea change, a demonstration that a paradigm shift is underway. We must
take account.

